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This  paper  reviews  in a rather  general,  brief and  selective  way  the  changes  taking
place  over  seven  dynamic  years  in ten  Central  and  Eastern  European  Countries,
CEECs.  It is difficult to  reference  or  substantiate  in detail  all  the  statements  made
here.  For  practically  every  sentence  there  is  an  exception  for  some  country  or
commodity  or  group.  These  are  generalisations,  but  hopefully  ones  which  are
recognisably  close  to  reality.  The  paper  proceeds  by  trying  to  answer  four
questions.  What  is transition?  Has  it  happened?  What  have  been  the  effects?
What  are the implications?
There  is  little generally  available  systematic  statistical  back-up  referring  to  these
countries.  The  two  main  sources  used  in  this paper  are first,  the  annual  reports  of
the  OECD  Centre  for  Co-operation  with  Economies  in  Transition:  Agricultural
Policies,  Markets and  Trade  in the Transition Economies:  Monitoring  and Evaluation.
Second,  reference  is  made  to  the  set  of  Long  Term  Prospects  the  European
Commission  recently  published  (Commission,  1997)  for  seven  products  for the  ten
CEECs  who  have  applied  for membership  of the  EU.  The  Commission  data  is  not
used  because  one  has  confidence  that  the  European  interest  is  so  self-evidently
high  they  must  have  put considerable  time  and  resources  into  their analysis',  it is
simply  that,  right or  wrong,  this analysis  will shape  official  perceptions  in  the  next
year or two as entry negotiations start.
What is transition?
The  transition  under  discussion  is  the  set  of  changes  in political  and  economic
systems  which  the  countries  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  voluntarily decided  to
undertake  starting  in the  period  1989  to  1991  and  which  are  still under  way.  The
essence  of the  political transformation  was  the  replacement  of the  one-party,  non-
democratic,  non-parliamentary  system  of government  by  a  pluralist,  parliamentary
system.  This aspect  of the  transition has  been  achieved  and  two  or  more  general
elections  have  occurred  in all  the  countries  under  discussion.  No  doubt  political
scientists are  closely analysing the  nature  and  workings  of the  democratic  systems
in CEECs,  and  it would  be  surprising  if there  are  not  imperfections  in some  of the
systems  in operation.  However,  this  author  is not  aware  of  significant failures  of
democracy  which  are  claimed  to  have  important  effects  on  micro-economic
restructuring of relevance  to the food and  agricultural sector.
The  macroeconomic  transformation  involved  changes  in the  monetary,  fiscal  and
exchange  rate  systems.  Whilst  many  of these  elements  were  achieved  rapidly  in
some countries (eg Poland, Czech  Republic and Hungary) there is still some doubt if
they  are  going  to  be  achieved  in  some  others  (eg  Bulgaria  and  Romania).  The
banking system has still to make the transition from  state to  private even in the most
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stability  in  the  region;  low  inflation,  positive  growth  and  stable  exchange  rates  in
some,  but  rapid  price  inflation  coupled  with  severe  recession  and  rapidly
depreciating  exchange  rates  in  others.2   This  difference  in  progress  in
macroeconomic  reforms  is  a  major  factor  explaining  the  extent  of  micro-economic
reforms.  A  profoundly  unstable  macro-economy  discourages  individuals  from
wanting  to  take the risk of setting up  a firm  and  discourages  lenders  from  enabling
them  to  do  so,  thereby  stifling  the  development  of  an  enterprise-based  market
economy.
The  transformation  affecting  agriculture  is  the  set  of  micro-economic  changes  in
economic  management,  factor  ownership,  price  determination  and  the  trading
relationships  domestically and  internationally.  In  the  previous  system,  economic
management was  determined  almost  entirely from  the  centre, the  role  of enterprise
managers was  to fulfil targets  set for them.  Their job was,  therefore,  pre-eminently
an administrative task which gave small scope or reward for individual  initiative.
The  primary  factors of  production  of  land  and  capital  were  collectively,  or  State,
owned  and  not  rewarded,  ie  rent and  interest  had  no  real  role.  Strictly  speaking,
land  ownership  was  largely  private,  in  that  most  land  was  not  nationalised;  the
property  rights  of  use,  income  and  alienation  of  land  were  expropriated  by
government  in  setting  up  the  collective farms. 3  Only  on  State  farms was  the  land
truly  publicly  owned.  One  of  the  main  exceptions  to  the  general  lack  of  private
property  use  rights  and  private  enterprise  were  the  household  plots  which  most
Collective  and  State  farm  workers  had  in  most  of  these  countries.  Whilst
Westerners  sometimes saw this  as a latent source of entrepreneurship  which,  given
the chance,  could become the foundation of a family farm agricultural  economy,  this
has happened to a disappointing extent.
Labour was  rewarded  by a wage  structure  based  on  social  evaluation  rather  than
productivity.  All  labour was  employed,  there  was  very  little self-employment.  The
agricultural  workforce  was  extremely  specialised.  Management  on  the  Collective
and  State  Farms  had  a  political  function  (to  demonstrate  the  skill  and  clout to  get
favourable  plans  and  treatment  from  input  suppliers  and  product  recipients),  an
administrative  function  (to  receive  and  record  the  fulfilment  of  the  plans),  and  a
technocratic  function  (solving  the  problems  of  crop  pests,  animal  disease  or  of
machinery).  In all  these activities there was  no  recourse to concepts of true cost  or
profitability.  At the field and  shop-floor  level,  functions were  also  very specialised.
There was very little scope for labour mobility and no labour market.
Prices performed  only an  accountancy  role.  They  had  no  function  of equilibrating
markets  or  allocating  resources,  and,  one  suspects,  only  a  small  function  in
allocating  budget  expenditures  for  individuals.  Thus,  quantities  produced  and
consumed were  very largely determined  in  central  plans.  People  didn't especially
choose  to  consume  the  observed  mix  of  Ladas  and  Skodas  or  white  and  yellow
cheese, they consumed what had been centrally decided should be available.
Economic relations  in the input supply and output processing  chains were essentially
concerned with throughput planning.  How much to export and import  and how much
trade with  hard currency  zones were  all  centrally determined.  Much of the trade was
based  on  the  CMEA where  an  attempt  was  made  by  the  planners  to  exploit  crude
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endowment  and technical productivity) by strong regional specialisation  and trade.
The structure  of enterprises  in the  food chain,  of course,  reflected  the  operation  of
the economic  system.  These  structures,  generally,  were  not  stable.  There  was  a
constant  process  of redefining  the  boundaries  of each  stage  of the  chain  as  the
planners tried to get the system to work more effectively.  Because the food  industry
is multi-layered  - from  input supply to farm  level,  to first stage processing,  to  second
stage food  manufacturing,  wholesaling  and  retailing  - there was  a strong  degree  of
vertical  integration  in  the  product  filieres.  The  result  was  a  high  degree  of
concentration  at  each  stage  in  the  chain  and  thus a  high  degree  of  co-ordination
between  the  monoliths involved.  As the commodities  do  not  involve  a great  deal  of
technical  interaction  in  most  stages  (outside the farm  level),  the organisations  tend
to be product defined,  eg the meat,  or grain or dairy product processing  enterprises.
These  same  organisations  invariably  controlled  the  product  storage  and  also
international trade.
The  economic transformation  meant,  or  was supposed  to  mean,  changing  most  of
these features.  The broadest aspects of the transformation  were  the abandonment
of  central  planning  as  the  main  method  of  resource  allocation  and  thus  the
decentralisation  of  micro-economic  management  down  to  individual  enterprises.
This  has  been  done.  The  national  and  local offices  of the  central  planning  system
disappeared  quickly  throughout  the  region.4  However,  the  legal  and  institutional
dimensions of these changes are  enormous and  have  no-where  been  completed  in
the seven and  a half years of transition  to date.  The  equally  challenging  transition
required was  the  change  in  attitudes for  nearly all  citizens.  Although  the  previous
system had  not brought the  range and choice of product, the  quality standards  and
the degree of variety and innovation found  in the West, it did create a high degree  of
stability  and  security.  The  State  undertook  to  supply the  educational,  social  and
material  needs of the population,  and by and large it did.  The removal  of the surety
that  the  state  would  provide  was,  no  doubt,  a  wonderful  release  for  some  in  the
population who felt smothered  in the old  system,  but for the  bulk of the population it
has  been  a  massive  shock.  Some  of  the  older  generation  have  not,  and  will  not,
adjust  to the  new  situation.  Not  all  younger  people find  it easy to  orientate  to  the
emerging  economic structures.
There  was  no  dispute  anywhere  that  an  essential  part  of  the  decentralisation
process was to create the private ownership  of enterprise  capital.  Thus, much  if not
most capital  in  the  whole food  chain  has  been,  in  one way  or  another,  privatised.
There was much more dispute over the appropriate disposition of land.  Because  in
most of the CEECs  most of the land had been collectivised (ie  not nationalised), the
de-collectivisation  process  usually  took  the  form  of  restitution  of  (more  of)  the
property rights in  land to the former owners or their heirs.  Only where land was truly
state owned was there a question of privatising it by distribution, sale or some other
process.  This process is described and discussed in detail in Swinnen et al (1997).
For most of the food chain, the factor requiring least transformation was labour.  Pre-
reform,  people were salaried or wage-earning  employees,  and after the reforms they
were  still  (if they were  lucky) employees.  The exceptions  in  the food sectors  were in
those  parts  of  the  chain  which  lend  themselves  to  much  smaller  organisational
forms,  that  is  on  farms  and  at  the  retail  level.  In  each  of  these  sectors,
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businesses if they had the courage and imagination  to do it, and  if they could secure
access to working  capital and markets for their produce.
The  transformation  process  for prices,  for  economic  relations  and  for  international
trade is easily said in a  single word,  liberalisation.  Even the first act of implementing
this transformation  is  quite easily achieved,  the government  no  longer  dictates  the
prices  at  each stage  in  the  chain  and  no  longer plans  the  volume  of  trade  which
takes place.  This was achieved  in  nearly all the  countries within  one or two  years.
However,  the  dismantlement  of  the  old  system  is  only  part  of  the  story.  In  the
absence  of the  pre-requisites  of a  competitive  market  economy:  good  information,
clear  definition  of property  rights,  trust,  enforcement  of contract  and  provision  for
bankruptcy,  it is far from clear that price determination,  economic relations and trade
are  liberalised  in  the  sense  understood  in  the  West.  Simple  indicators  like  the
proportion  of capital  in  the  private  sector are  poor guides  to  the  extent  of  market-
based activity.
It is generally  accepted that  transition  does  not  imply the  creation  of any  particular
size or organisational form  of farms or other businesses in  the food  chain.  What is
deemed  to  be  important  is  the way the  businesses  behave  (ie.  independently),  the
institutional  environment  in which  they operate,  and the degree  of interference  they
are  subjected  to  by government.  Thus  the  farm  and food  industry  structure  which
emerges  is  an  outcome of transition  not a  pre-determined  target.  In Western  eyes
there  is  no  particular  goal  for  the  sizes  or  structure  of farms  or  firms  in  the  food
chain.  That  said,  because  many  Western  observers  are  strongly  attached  to  the
(fast disappearing?)  family farm,  they  seem  convinced that  any  restructuring  which
departs from  this model  is doomed to fail.
For  a  real  transition  to  the  market,  much  more  important  than  business  size  and
structure  is the existence of competition and choice.  If farmers really have  no choice
about the source of their inputs or to whom they sell their products, then there is little
scope  to  achieve  the  benefits  of  a  market  system.  It  is  generally  held  that
competition  will  not emerge  unless enterprises  are  privatised.  Especially  given  the
kind of economic relations  in the previous  system,  a  mere  division and restructuring
of  enterprises  will  not  create  conditions  for  competition.  Only  with  truly  private
enterprise  based  on  private  capital  can  such  competition  arise.  However,
privatisation itself is not a sufficient condition for the creation of competition.  If state
monopolies  are  turned  into  private  (perhaps  regional)  monopolies,  the  more
fragmented farming sector is still at a severe competitive disadvantage.
Completely forgotten by most Western advisers and by the countries involved,  is the
existence of many  market failures and  undesirable distributional consequences of a
switch  from  planned  to  market  resource  allocation.  Whilst  the  central  planning
system did pay a great deal of attention to issues we  in the West consider under the
heading  of  rural  development,  it  was  no  better  at  dealing  with  environmental
problems  than  the  market  system.  Transition  ought,  therefore  to  make  explicit
institutional provision for the agri-environment and rural development.
In  short, transition  can  be  thought  as  having  two  components,  first,  the changes  in
government  policy  and  their  institutions  and  second,  the  changes  in  behaviour  of
economic agents  in  response to their new operating  environment.
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Transition  is  a  process  and  many  of  the  elements  summarised  above  involve
qualitative change.  Therefore  it will  always  be  a  matter  of judgement  whether  it is
possible  to  say  transition  is  over  and  that  these  countries  are  now  'market
economies'.  The  formal  changes  in  policy  and  economic  institutions  have  largely
been made.  Economic management is now decentralised.  Much  agricultural  capital,
and a significant part of capital in the food industry has been  privatised.  Land reform
and  farm  restructuring  is  well  under  way,  but  for  only  a  minority  of  land  in  most
countries  do  owners  have  deeds  which  give  them  full  property  rights.  As  a
consequence,  land  markets  are  scarcely  operating  anywhere.  Domestic  and
international  economic  transactions  based  on  normal  market  relations  within  a
framework of property  and contract law are  becoming the  norm.  Yet none  of these
processes is complete.
The  destructive,  or  negative  part  of  transition  which  is  the  dismantlement  of  the
institutions and procedures of central planning was not so difficult  or time consuming
to  do.  The  constructive  part  of  creating  the  legal  and  civil  institutions  of  a
decentralised  economy  and  encouraging  individuals  to  assume  responsibility  has
turned out to be a much  more difficult and slower process.
The reorientation  of attitudes has  met with  mixed success.  It is  remarkable  how fast
some people can  and have made the transition, yet there  is  still a massive  inertia  to
be  overcome  to  change the  attitude  of dependence  on  the  state  and  to  persuade
citizens that they have been  empowered  by the system change.  It is plain  that in  all
the  CEECs  a  class  of 'entrepreneurs'  emerged  practically  instantaneously.  These
were  partly  members  of  the  nomenklatura  who  had  access  to,  or  control  over,
resources  and  who  certainly  had  knowledge  of  supply  chains  for  essential  goods
and services.  Many of these people are  now running the privatised,  or about-to-be-
privatised,  companies which have emerged  from the former state enterprises.  Apart
from considerations of fairness and equal opportunity, it would have been a waste of
resources for the skills, knowledge and experience of such people  not to  have been
employed  in this way.
However it would  be  a  mistake  to assume  that the  path  through  privilege  describes
the  route  for the  bulk of the  emerging  entrepreneurs.  It is  quite  clear that  a  large
number  of  people  who  previously  had  no  managerial  responsibilities  in  the  old
system  or who  were  often  too  young  to  have  been  employed  in  that  system  have
become self-made managers.  These people have generally had no formal,  relevant,
management  training.  It is too  soon to  expect any  real  effect from  such  business
training  activities  as  have  been  built  up  with  US  and  European  assistance  since
1990.
This  is the success part of the story.  However it  is just as plain that there is a very
large group in the adult population who  have not taken to the  market  like a duck to
water.  All visitors and researchers who visit the CEECs  are struck with the distance
still to  be  travelled  in  attitudes  and  understanding  of the fundamental  principles  of
how a market  economy functions.  It is  not surprising  that these  attitudes  persist  in
sectors which  even  in  the  West  are  still  in  State control,  but  it  is  instructive of the
time  required  for  the  populace  to  learn  to  live  with  the  market,  when  they  are
discovered  amongst  the  managers  of  private  sector  enterprises.  The  conclusion
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generational  turnover.  Concepts  such  as  input  norms,  (absolute)  costs  of
production and cost-plus pricing seem deeply etched  in the minds of the population.
Such  ideas are not easily changed  by formal  education,  and  certainly  not  by three-
week  business management  courses  given  even  by  the  most  prestigious  Western
institutions.
In this situation where the security and props of central planning  have been removed
and  where  the  desire,  the  knowledge  and  the  institutions  for  efficient  markets  to
operate are not fully in place it is hardly surprising that State  intervention  is still  very
evident.  This  is  certainly  the  story  of  the  farm  and  food  sector.  Two  different
interpretations  are being made from this experience.  The first, expressed  by  Hartell
and Swinnen  (1997),  is that  a remarkably similar sequence of agricultural  price  and
trade  policy  has  developed  in  all  the  CEECs  since  1989.  They  see  policy
development following  three  steps.  First there  was  a  period  of  liberalisation  when
the former control apparatus was removed  (mostly  achieved by late  1991).  Second,
there  was  a  period  in  which  tariff  barriers  were  employed  and  protection  of
agriculture started  (or resumed).  In the third stage,  more  recently, there has  been a
proliferation  of non-tariff measures  interfering  directly with trade  (eg variable  import
levies, export subsidies or export bans and quotas) or domestic support measures.  It
is notable that many of the instruments  bear similarities with the support instruments
of the EU's  Common  Agricultural  Policy.  Swinnen  goes on to  point out that  such a
development path is a compressed  repetition of the same path followed  by Western
Europe  during  the  last  100  years.  This  path  is  characterised  as  liberalisation,
followed  by  tariff  protection  followed  by  non-tariff  protection  where  each  stage  is
pursued as a reaction to dissatisfactions with the previous stage.
A  different  interpretation  is  that  the  CEECs  did  indeed  follow  the  example  of  the
West,  but  that  the  apparent  stages  cannot  meaningfully  be  interpreted  along  the
lines of the endogenous  political economy  explanation.  It can be  argued that  there
never was  any  real  intention  to  liberalise  the  food  and  agricultural  sector.  The
CEECs  could observe that the  'market economies' from  New Zealand and Australia,
via the  USA and the  EU,  to Norway  and  Japan, without exception,  deployed  highly
interventionist  measures  for  agriculture  during  their  period  of  greatest  economic
development.  With  this  lesson  in  view,  they,  not  unnaturally,  deduced  that
'transition'  means  switching  from  central  determination  of  prices,  production,
distribution  and  trade  to  decentralised  determination  of  these  variables  but,  for
agriculture,  within  a web  of government  regulation  and  intervention.  If this  is  the
strategy, and a reading of the various CEEC  laws to support, regulate or protect food
and agriculture suggests that it is fairly explicitly so, then  it is not very surprising that
implementing this strategy would have to follow the three 'steps' observed.
Dismantling the apparatus of planning is bound, initially, to leave the sector exposed
(ie  liberalised).  This  is  unavoidable  before  a  standard  system  of  tariffs  can  be
introduced  and  implemented 5  It  takes  longer  to  develop  the  instruments  and
institutions  of  agricultural  market  regulation,  so  these  followed  along  two  or  three
years after tariffs were gradually increased.
That  the  support  instruments,  (but  not  their  level  or  the  budgetary  resources
deployed)  mirror those  of the  EU  results from  the fact that the CEECs  all  aspire  to
full  membership  of the EU.  Despite the  barrage  of (largely  academic) advice  to  the
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Council  of Ministers,  to date,  shows  few  signs that  it intends  changing  the  CAP  in
the  near future.  In  such  circumstances,  realpolitik suggests that  CEECs  who  have
no  intention  of  leaving  their  agricultural  sector  to  the  vagaries  of  the  market  are
sensible  in adopting  support measures consonant with those of the  EU.  In any case
a  great  deal  of  the  advice  of  Europeans  (probably  nearly  all  the  advice  offered
except by those attending  this conference)  was  almost  certainly  for these  countries
to mimic the apparatus of the Union  as fast as they could.
In  short,  a great deal  of the formal  legislation for all the  main  elements  of transition
listed  in  the first section  has  been  enacted and  is  in the  course  of  implementation.
The  major  remaining  tasks  are  the  consolidation  of  these  changes  and  their
absorption  into the mentality  and actions of economic actors  at  large.  This  is not  to
say that there is  no more legislative and institutional  construction  to do,  there  is still
a  long way to  go  before  the financial  and  managerial  infrastructure  of the  region  is
fully conducive to business development.  This  is a matter  of creating  and  enforcing
respect for the law in business dealings,  the enforcement of contract  and redress for
those cheated.  It is also a matter of creating truly competitive conditions.
With what effects?
If the  populations of this region  had known  in summer  1989 the privations  they were
about  to  experience  one  wonders  if  they  would  have  greeted  the  collapse  of
communism  with  the  enthusiasm  they  showed  later  that  year.  There  has  been  a
heavy  short-run  cost  of  transition.  Economic  output  has  fallen.  GDP  fell  in  all
CEECs  but Latvia  in  1990,  in all of them  in  1991,  in all  but Poland  in  1992,  in  all  but
Poland,  Romania and  Slovenia in  1993.  Only in  1994 was  there  positive  growth for
the  whole  region.  This  has  mostly  continued,  though  not  in  1996  in  Bulgaria.
Although there has been economic growth  in the region since 1994, the growth rates
have been much  lower than the contractions in  1990 - 1993.  Thus only  in Poland  is
it  conceivable  that  GDP  is  now  re-approaching  its  1989  level.  Seven  years  of
lowered  living  standards  is  a  big  price  to  pay  for  a  new  economic  and  political
system.  Inflation  and  unemployment,  which  in  the  former  system  were  not explicit,
have  become  so  in  stark terms.  These costs  have  not fallen uniformly for citizens.
Relative  few  have  enjoyed  massive  rises  in  their  living  standards,  thus  income
inequalities have widened.
In seven  of the ten  CEECs,  agriculture has  apparently contracted much  more  than
the rest of the economy.  In all countries but Romania,  and to a much smaller extent
Latvia  and  Slovenia,  the  share  of  agriculture  in  GDP  has  fallen.  In Lithuania,
Estonia  and  the  Czech  Republic,  agriculture's  contribution  to  GDP  has  fallen
dramatically.  This is the result of both the real contraction in agricultural  output and
the rise in output of the service sector of the economy.
Table 1 and figure 1 show the development of the volume of gross agricultural output
since reform.  Slovenia suffered  least from the process and has  recovered the small
reduction  in  output.  Romania,  Poland  and  the  Slovak  Republic  suffered  the
common  20  -25%  contraction  from  1989  to  1992,  but  have  seen  positive  growth
since  that year.  Romania  is now  back to  its  pre-reform  output,  the  others  are  still
behind  that  level.  Since  the  1992  collapse,  agriculture  in  the  Czech  Republic,
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decline  has  been  halted.  Baltic  agriculture  has  declined  throughout  the  period
shown and is now at around one-half of the pre-reform  level.
It is very  difficult to get  up-to-date figures for all  the main  commodity  sectors for  all
the  CEECs.  The  most  recently  presented  comprehensive  analysis  across  the
CEEC-10  by the  European Commission  was not able to find  consistent figures for  all
seven  commodities  for all the  CEECs  for  1995 or  1996.  Their analysis,  which  they
label as provisional,  is reviewed  in Tables 2  to 5.  These figures  are  interesting  for
what they reveal  about the judgements being made  in  Brussels concerning  the pace
of  'recovery'  of  agriculture  in  the  CEECs,  and  the  broad  effects  expected  from
accession.  To see how the Brussels view of the recovery in  CEECs is being  revised,
the  enclosed  tables  compare  the  figures  published  in  April  1997  with  those
published in the Commission's  so-called Agricultural Strategy Paper  in late  1995.
Table 2 and 3 show production and domestic disappearance respectively,  and tables
4  and 5  show these figures expressed  as  annual  percentage  rates  of  growth.  The
data show just two points  in the transition  process,  1989 and  1994,  and  then  make
projections for the pre-accession  period and the  post accession  period.6  Two years
ago  it  was fashionable  to talk of  accession  in  the  year  2000.  This  date  has  now
been  pushed  forward  to  2002.  Also  two  years  ago  the  Commission  had  the
confidence to make projections forward to the year 2010.  This was,  no doubt,  partly
a signal to the  CEECs  to encourage them  to think about  long  transition  periods  for
accession for certain  aspects  of  policy.  In  their  1997  report,  the  Commission  has
been more cautious and projects only three years of post-accession  experience  until
2005.  For political reasons,  their projections assume  simultaneous  accession  by  all
ten CEECs on  1st January 2002.7
Looking first at production for cereals  and beef the Commission  now claims that the
production  decline  between  1989  and  1994  was  actually  larger  than  previously
thought  and  they  have  revised  downwards  their  projections  of  production  post-
accession  in  2005  (-7%  for  cereals  and  -13%  for  beef).  For  all  the  other
commodities  reviewed  (oilseeds,  sugar,  milk,  pork  and  poultry)  the  projected
production  for  2005  has  been  revised  up  - though  with  the  exception  of  sugar
(+13%)  generally only marginally.  The consumption  projections  have mostly  been
revised  marginally  upwards.  Only for  sugar  and  beef where  the  1994  figure  was
revised  downwards  have  the  projected  domestic  disappearance  figures  also  been
revised  down.  For  all  the  other  commodities  utilisation  has  been  projected  to  be
higher than previously estimated by about 2%.
It is  more  striking  to  view  these  projections  in  terms  of  the  annual  growth  rates
assumed  both pre  and  post-accession.  These are  shown  in  tables 4  and  5 which
have  been  calculated  from  the  Commission  data.  The  summary  of the  effect  of
transition (so far) is that production and utilisation of all seven products fell  between
2%  and 8%  per annum  on average  between  1989 and  1994.  It is interesting to see
that,  apart  from  cereals,  the  contraction  in  production  for  these  commodities  was
higher, and often much higher, than the contraction in domestic utilisation.  From this
base  there  is  a  tremendous  act  of  faith  that  all these  downward  trends  will  be
reversed  between  1994  and  accession.  Thus  the  rates  of  growth  assumed  for  all
products  are  positive  both  for  production  and  utilisation  for  an  eight  year  pre-
39accession  recovery  period  1994  - 2002.  The  evidence  for  this  trend  reversal  is
reviewed  below.
For most  products it  is assumed  that the production  recovery  will  be faster  than  the
consumption  recovery.  The  exception  is  milk  where  a  slightly  faster  utilisation
growth  is  expected.  The development of production  and utilisation  assumed  by  the
Commission for the period  after accession  is puzzling.  Generally, for most products,
production  growth  from  2002  to  2005  is  expected  to  be  much  lower  than  the
development  between  now  and  accession.  This  is  surprising  because  most  other
analysts have  assumed  that the  effect of the  more  stable  and  remunerative  prices
under the CAP  will stimulate investment and productivity growth  in  CEEC agriculture
leading  to  enhanced  growth  in  production.  Only  in the  case  of cereals,  beef and
dairy  products  is this  the  Commission's  assumption.  It is  perhaps  less  surprising,
given the  expected price  rises,  that they  project the rate  of consumption  growth  to
fall  after  accession  for  all  commodities,  and  for  some  (eg  beef  and  sugar)  for
consumption  actually to fall.  However this  seems  to  suggest  that  general  income
growth  rates and income  elasticities for food will  be  lower  after  accession  than  pre-
accession.
On what kind of analysis are these figures based?  The short answer is  that there is
no  published information  on  the underlying  models.  They  are  certainly  not derived
from rigorous,  econometric models of the CEEC  agricultural economy.  Such  models
do  not  exist  inside  or  outside  the  Commission.  These  figures  are  undoubtedly  a
mixture  of  very  simple  and  broad-brush  judgements  about  technical  progress,
economic  growth  and  price  changes  in  prospect  during  the  pre-  and  post-entry
periods.  It has to be said that the economic basis for these projections  is weak.
It is interesting to deduce from this analysis what the Commission  is  assuming about
the  application  of the  CAP  to  the  new  members.  The  details  offered  on  this  are
slight.  "...all  10  CECs  will join in 2002  and will  start applying  the CAP  in  its  current
form,  ie  including quantitative restrictions such  as  set  aside  and  production  quotas
for  dairy and  sugar  products,  and  will  gradually  align  their  prices  to  EU  levels."
(Commission,  1997,  p55).  Strangely  though,  only  in  the  cereal  and  oilseeds
sectors  is any impact  of supply management  explicitly shown.  Taking  an  assumed
nominal  17.5%  set  aside  rate,  and  allowing  for  a  proportion  of  CEEC  farms  to
escape set aside through the  'simplified  scheme' for small farms,  the area reduction
effect  is  shown  to  have  a  net effect on  production  in  2002  of about  7%  (Table  2).
Cereal  yield  recovery  thereafter  (Table 4)  is  assumed  to  be  higher  post-accession
(2.%  p.a.)  compared to pre-accession (1.8%  p.a.).  In the case of sugar and milk, the
two  products  for  which  there  are  production  quotas,  production  is  projected  to
continue to  rise post-accession.  This could  be  explained in  several ways.  It could
imply that the Commission  is willing to negotiate fairly generous quotas for CEECs  to
enable  them  to  recover more  of their production  'loss'  before  it is  capped for  ever
more.  Alternatively  it  could  be  interpreted  that  the  Commission  does  not  expect
adoption  of these  regulations  immediately  upon  accession,  or  that these  countries
will  not be asked to apply production restraint.  The oddest figures  are for milk and
beef where  the  post-accession  production  growth  rates  are  actually  greater  than
those  expected  pre-accession.  This does  not  square  with  a  regime  of  tight  supply
management.
40Putting  these  production  and  utilisation  figures  together,  the  resulting  commodity
market  balances  are  shown  in  Table  6.  In  1995  the  Commission  expected  the
CEECs  to  have  export  surpluses  for  all  products  except  sugar.  Its  revisions  to
production  and  utilisation  have  caused  the  balance  for  cereals  to  switch  to  a  net
deficit  and  for  sugar  to  switch  to  a  net  surplus.  Their  projected  surpluses  for
oilseeds,  pork and poultry are all up somewhat,  and for milk and beef are down.  On
balance, therefore,  the latest Commission  projections have diminished  the spectre  of
enormous  market  management  problems  arising from  the  adoption  of  the  CAP  by
CEECs.  By far,  the most important  of the revisions made  is the estimated  reduction
in the cereal market balance of over eight million tonnes (from  net surplus  of 7  mt to
a deficit of  1 mt)  They do not calculate the budgetary  consequences  of these  new
projections,  but,  on  this  analysis,  they  will  certainly  be  less  than  the  12  BECU
calculated in the 1995 exercise.
It should be stressed that by presenting the Commission data  in the form  of average
annual  growth  rates  for  the  CEEC-10  there  is  no  suggestion  that  this  was  the
analytical  approach  used  by  the  Commission.  It  is  hoped  and  assumed  that  the
analysis was done annually by product  and country and then  aggregated.  There  is
certainly a very wide  range  of experience  masked  by the aggregate  data.  Table  7
shows  the  development  of  grain  (wheat  plus  coarse  grains)  production  for  the
individual  CEECs  from  1986/89  to  1995.  Grain  production  fell  everywhere  after
reforms especially in the disastrous year of 1992.  Since then  it has continued  to fall
in the three Baltic states.  It has been  erratic in the Czech and Slovak Republics and
Bulgaria,  and  it  has  risen everywhere  else.  Of particular  note  is  that the  strongest
growth  in output post-1992 is  in the two  most  important grain  producing  countries  in
the region,  Poland  and  Romania.  In those two  countries together  grain  production
has  grown  at  an  average  annual  rate  of  12.5%  since  1992.  Even  when  this
performance  is  diluted  by  the  slower  growth  or  continued  contraction  in  the  other
CEECs,  the average  grain production  growth  rate for the ten  in  the four  years since
1992 is just below 7%  per annum.  Seen  in this light, the Commission's  projections  of
1.8%  per annum for the next eight years followed  by 2.2%  post-accession, could  be
argued to  be  unrealistically low.  Differences  in these magnitudes  of annual  growth
rates  add up  to tens of millions  of tonnes over the ten year projection  period  under
consideration.
What are  the implications?
Economic transition from  central planned to market allocation of resources  has been
irreversibly achieved in Central  and Eastern  Europe.  Notwithstanding the hiccups in
the  major  processes of liberalisation and  privatisation, and  the restoration  to power
of Socialist (ie.  former  Communist)  parties  in many  CEECs,  there  is  no  suggestion
anywhere  of a retreat to  the former  economic system.  The  major  problem  is  that
whilst, superficially, most  of the  major formal  steps  in  economic  liberalisation have
been  taken, there  is a  much  more  uneven  and generally unimpressive depth  of real
reform  on the ground.  This is certainly the case in agriculture.
Land reform  laws have been  passed and mostly implemented.  In most countries  it is
claimed  that a  majority  of the  agricultural  land  has  been  'privatised'.  But  in  reality,
full  restoration  of property  rights  culminating  in  the  possibility  to  rent  or  sell  land
through  an  open  market  is  still  confined  to  a  small  fraction  of  the  land.  This
41significantly reduces  the  real  choices  open  to  land owners.  It also  constrains  the
ability of those who wish to acquire land to create, and invest  in,  viable farming  units.
Furthermore  it reduces  the  capacity  of farmers  to  use  land  as  collateral  to  secure
loans for working  and  investment  capital.  These  are  some  of the  most  important
reasons  that  farming  structures  have,  in  most  countries,  changed  less  than
observers,  at first, expected.  There  has  been a development from the extremely  bi-
polar  pre-reform  structures  - the  enormous  State  and  Collective  farms  at  one
extreme  and the  numerous  household plots at the other.  The large  units have  been
split and their organisational form  is now much more varied,  encompassing  producer
co-operatives,  labour  managed  firms,  joint stock  companies,  farming  associations
and  partnerships.  The  smaller  units  have  often  grown  in  size.  Family  plots  have
been  merged  with  restituted  land,  and  these  'family  farmers'  have  acquired  more
land  through  primitive,  informal,  short-term  land  leasing  and  share  cropping
arrangements.  Many of them operate on a part time basis where  the other source  of
income is off-farm work or retirement  pension.
Price formation  and  international  trade have  both  been  'liberalised',  in  the sense  of
released from central planning.  However,  agricultural product markets and trade  are
far  from  liberal.  Governments  throughout  the  region  have  surrounded  their
agriculture, just as  in the West,  with a mass of border and domestic  regulation  and
controls.  The  main  difference  with  the  West  is that this  support  and  protection  is
unstable  and  unpredictable  - it  is  subject  to  erratic  changes  - and  it operates  at
generally  a  lower  level  than  in  the  West  as  measured  by  protection  rates  and
budgetary expenditures.
On the  face  of  it, formally,  the  privatisation  and  restructuring  of the  upstream  and
downstream  sectors  has  also  progressed.  Most  of  the  big  state  enterprises
supplying  inputs  or  processing  products  have  apparently  disappeared.  It is  much
less clear what  has  replaced  them.  There  is  genuine  competition  in  some  sectors
and  at  some  levels  - notably  at  retail  level.  There  is  also  some  competition  with
foreign sources and destinations - certainly more than previously.  But the process of
opening-up,  of providing  economic agents with  a  choice of suppliers or purchasers,
of providing  market  information, ease  of market entry and general  transparency  has
a  very  long  way  to  go.  The  data  available  does  not  yet  permit  soundly-based
comparisons  of farm-gate  to  retail  price  spreads  and  marketing  margins  amongst
these countries or between  them  and  Western  Europe.  However the feeling  is that
these  margins  are  large  in  the  CEECs  due  to  a  mixture  of  inefficiency,  waste,
transfer pricing  and the lack of competition.
The region  is therefore  still very much  in  a state of transition - especially at ground
level - in terms of the behaviour of farms and firms and their inter-relationships.  This
has implications for both the CEECs themselves and for the West.
Implications for the CEECs
Transition of the kind being attempted  in Central  and Eastern  Europe is not bound to
take  two  or three  decades as currently  appears  likely.  Some  other countries  have
achieved  it much  more  rapidly  than  this;  one  example  is  provided  by  Argentina
which  completed  between  1990  and  1995  most  of the  same  reforms  as  are  still
underway after  eight years  in the  CEECs.  Of course,  the  starting  conditions  were
42not  identical,  and  although  Argentina  suffered  great  political  and  economic
instability,  there  was  already  developed  a  strong  sense  of  the  market  and  private
business.  However the  Argentine  example  serves  to  illustrate  that  a  pre-condition
for market  development  is that the  Government  must  have  a  very clear  belief  in  the
market solution and  a determination to make the reforms work.
In  the  CEECs  it  is  not at  all  obvious that  there  is a  clear-minded  view  of  the  real
objectives of reform  for agriculture,  or a well-defined vision  of the  role  of agriculture
in  their  reformed  economy.  What  are  they  trying  to  achieve?  What  are  the  real
priorities?  Several  of these countries  have export  potential.  In none  is  it clear  that
the  realisation  of  this  potential  by  taking  all  actions  to  improve  international
competitiveness  is  the  primary  policy goal.  Objectives tend  to  be  an  unclear  and
changing  mix  of  raising  farmers  living  standards,  maintaining  agricultural
employment to  reduce the exodus of the rural population to the towns,  and  ensuring
food  security.  The same,  of course,  has  been  true for the  US  since  the  1930s and
the  EC  since  1957.  The  lesson  from  these  latter countries  is  that  the  result  of
unclear  priorities  is  unclear  policy.  The  CEECs  seem  destined  to  follow  in  this
tradition.
This is illustrated  by the instability of the policies pursued to date.  The price support
arrangements  and  border  measures  have  changed  frequently  and  erratically,
betraying  a lack of clarity of purpose of these measures.  The result  is to discourage
local  investment  and  certainly foreign  investment.  It cannot  be  the  goal  of  CEEC
agricultural  policy to discourage the  development of the  industry,  but it appears that
it is one of the effects.  Farmer's  incomes  are therefore  growing  less fast than  they
might.
The  major  implication  of the way transition  has occurred  so far  in  the  region  is  that
nothing like the potential for development has been achieved.  This further suggests
that unless there is  a significant change  in the  policy and economic environment  for
agriculture there  is no reason to expect more  rapid development  in the future than  in
the past.
Implications for the EU
These remarks will be confined to some  implications for the EU.  Analysts from other
countries are  better  placed to  work out the  implications  for their own  interests  than
the author.
From  an EU  perspective,  it is not an enticing prospective  to embrace  quickly, as full
members,  countries  in  which  there  are  significant  problems  of  agricultural
development.  It is even  less enticing if the new members  enter with  the notion that
EU  agricultural  policy  is  designed,  and  has  the  capacity,  to  make  very  large
budgetary  transfers  to  provide  income  support for  farmers.  If, furthermore,  these
agricultural  systems are  served  by  technologically poor  and  inefficiently  managed
supply and  processing industries, which  could easily be out-competed  in  the single
market of the  EU,  then  enlargement  could  be  an economic  and  political  disaster for
established  and  new members  alike.  The main  implication  of this  is  that  EU  policy
pre-accession  should  be  more  concerned  with  the  actions  CEECs  can  take  to
43improve  the  competitiveness  of  their  agriculture  and  agribusiness,  than  whether
CEEC  policies are immediately compatible with the CAP.
A final remark  concerns the present state of knowledge of conditions,  behaviour  and
performance of farms and food industry at the micro-economic  level  in the region.  In
short,  it  is extremely thin.  Most  quantitative analysis  is  being  conducted  at  market
level  based  on  data  of dubious quality.  At the  farm  and firm  level,  the  information
base  is even  worse.  The statistical  authorities  in the CEECs  have  not plugged  the
holes  in  their  statistics  since  reform.  The  data  on  the  numbers  and  nature  of
production  structures  is  scant,  confusing  and  contradictory.  As  the  population
characteristics of farming  structures  are  not well  known,  it makes  it very  difficult  to
devise soundly based  surveys to discover the nature of the main categories  of farms
and  firms.  The  result  is  that analysts  have  a  poor basis  for  knowing  the  present
situation of production,  productivity and financial performance  of different farm types.
This  makes  it  even  more  difficult  to  project  the  likely  response  of these  different
organisations  to  changes  in  economic  circumstances.  Similarly,  without  more
detailed  micro-economic data,  it  is very  difficult to  know the  economic  relationships
between  the various agents  in the food chain and  thus to  know  how support  will  be
shared  by  various parties  depending on  how  it  is channelled.  For  instance,  if an
object is to raise the prices received by wheat farmers,  is it better  to instigate  a floor
price support system or to direct liquidity in the form  of credit subsidies to millers?
Notwithstanding  the  paucity of data,  the  EU  (and  other agencies)  are  compelled  to
make  projections  on  the  basis  of  whatever  data  exists  and  to  draw  their  own
conclusions.  The result  is that the debate is  much less objective  and scientific  than
is  desirable  and  analyses  inevitably stand  accused  of being  tinged  with  the  belief
systems of the  analysts.  Is  it  a co-incidence that  the  projections  of CEEC  market
balances and the consequences of accession for the CAP produced  by the guardian
of the CAP,  the European  Commission,  are  less disastrous than those  of academics
and  the USDA  who tend to  take positions  less sympathetic to  the  CAP?  More  and
better information  on the ground  level progress  of transition  would  provide  a  better
basis for analysis and policy decision making.
There  is  a  consensus  that  productivity  improvement  and  the  drive  for  improving
quality of  CEEC  agricultural  products  are  essential  further transitional  steps to  be
made.  What  will  bring  them  about?  One  answer  is  to  encourage  greater  direct
foreign  investment.  This  is  the  way  not  only  to  inject  directly  the  improved
technology  and  standards  of the  West,  but  it  brings  with  it  more  disciplined  and
reliable  management  and  trading  practices.  But  for  most  of  the  region  this
investment, in turn, awaits a more stable and sure policy and economic environment.
The  creation  of such  an  environment  itself depends  partly  on  EU  accession  or  its
imminent prospect.  A certain amount of political courage  is necessary to break the
cycle:  the  EU  does  not  wish  to create  too  strong  expectations  of early  accession
because it judges the  CEECs  are  not yet ready;  investors  (local  and foreign)  who
are  necessary to prepare  the  CEECs  are reluctant to plunge  in  before  the political
commitment has been made for enlargement.
Finally  is  the  problem  of  the  appropriate  advice  to  CEEC  governments  who  are
determined  to protect their farmers.  These governments  are not slow to draw on the
models  provided  by the West.  What can we  most helpfully offer?  'Don't  do  as  we
have done'  is advice not well received.  Maybe the best option  is for the US  and the
44EU to stand back and encourage CEECs to take advice from  governments  who have
successfully  made  the  transition.  These  policy  questions  are  the  subject  of  the
succeeding papers in this conference.
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Endnotes
It  is almost certainly the case that there are  considerably more  resources deployed  in
monitoring  and  researching the agricultural situation in CEECs  in the  USDA  than there is in the  EU.
The European  Commission  has no full time individuals at all engaged  in this work, which  is
astonishing considering that it is the EU which will be embracing these countries into its midst,  not the
USA!
2  It is analytically difficult of course to distinguish macro-economic  instability arising from the
transition process  itself with that arising from the 'normal' business cycle of market economies.  For
example  is  the present  run on the  Czech  Korun the former or the latter?
3  In Poland  and Slovenia collectivisation was  successfully resisted,  so most  of their land was,
and still is,  farmed  in  small,  private holdings.
4  One suspects that many of the senior figures in  these organisations who had  the best
knowledge  of the real  'transactions', the  best suppliers and most  reliable customers, quickly moved
into the executive  positions of many  of the  privatised or restructured enterprises.  Whilst their
technical knowledge  of the markets  was  no doubt a big asset to the  new organisations whether they
have the  managerial  and  marketing  skills for efficient private enterprise  is  less certain.
5  Actually the CEECs all had tariff structures under the previous system,  but they were  largely
inoperative because  trade was  planned  and controlled quantitatively.
6  It is  obviously dangerous to look only at the aggregate  CEEC-10 figures only for two  historic
time  points, there  is a great deal  of variation from  country to country and year to year.  This will be
reviewed  briefly after the broad picture  of the Commission  analysis is examined.
There  has been no public announcement on whether the Eastemrn  Enlargement will follow the
10,000M  model  (all the runners set off from the same  line simultaneously)  or the Formula  1 model
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c  )Table 2  CEEC-10 production,  1989 & 1994,
European  Commission  projections 1994 - 2010.
2000/  2000*/
Production ('000t)  1989  1994  2002  2002*  2005  2010
Cereals  ('95)  88268  73968  85702  80110  89591  96653
('97)  88268  72620  84046  78427  83709
Oilseeds  ('95)  4473  3560  5079  4600  4899  5363
('97)  4473  3619  5546  5028  5192
Sugar  ('95)  4027  2747  3303  3468  3468
('97)  4027  2693  3722  3908
Milk  ('95)  38859  26003  30587  32117  32117
('97)  38859  27509  30955  32503
Beef  ('95)  1990  1401  1693  2009  2009
('97)  1990  1297  1562  1729
Pork  ('95)  5497  4021  4558  4780  5214
('97)  5575  4208  4914  5098
Poultry  ('95)  1754  1291  1721  1843  1980
('97)  1754  1256  1804  1879
Note:  Projections made  in  1995 ('95)  refer to 2000, projections made  in  1997
('97)  refer to 2002,  asterists show the effect in those years  of set
aside, assumed to be 15% for 2000 and  17.5%  for 2002.
Source:  Commission  1995 and 1997
Table 3  CEEC-10  domestic utilisation,  1989 & 1994,
with European  Commission  projections 1994 - 2010.
2000/  2000*/
Domestic use ('000t)  1989  1994  2002  2002*  2005  2010
Cereals  ('95)  91045  72706  79589  82425  85675
('97)  91045  72726  81610  84787
Oilseeds  ('95)  3936  3331  4242  4242  4242
('97)  3936  3331  4321  4323
Sugar  ('95)  4197  3399  4117  3911  3812
('97)  4561  3147  3934  3904
Milk  ('95)  34488  25571  28908  29530  30299
('97)  35138  26253  29897  30497
Beef  ('95)  1748  1400  1587  1406  1512
('97)  1748  1379  1491  1294
Pork  ('95)  5094  4093  4597  4783  5129
('97)  5171  4160  4805  4847
Poultry  ('95)  1426  1266  1537  1657  1775
('97)  1426  1266  1634  1685Table 4  Growth rates  in CEEC-10  production,  1989 & 1994,
with European  Commission  projections 1994 - 2010.
'94 -'00  '00-'05
Per cent per annum  '89  - '94 '94 - '02  '02  - '05  '05  - '10
Cereals  ('95)  -3,5  2,5  2,3  1,5
('97)  -3,8  1,8  2,2
Qilseeds  ('95)  -4,5  6,1  1,3  1,8
('97)  -4,1  5,5  1,1
Sugar  ('95)  -7,4  3,1  1,0  0,0
('97)  -7,7  4,1  1,6
Milk  ('95)  -7,7  2,7  1,0  0,0
('97)  -6,7  1,5  1,6
Beef  ('95)  -6,8  3,2  3,5  0,0
('97)  -8,2  2,4  3,4
Pork  ('95)  -6,1  2,1  1,0  1,8
('97)  -5,5  2,0  1,2
Poultry  ('95)  -5,9  4,9  1,4  1,4
('97)  -6,5  4,6  1,4
Table 5  Growth rates in CEEC-lO  utilisation,  1989 &-1994,
with European  Commission  projections 1994 - 2010.
'94 -'00  '00  - '05
Percent  per annum  '89 - '94  '94 - '02  '02'-  '05  '05  - '10
Cereals  ('95)  .- 4,4  1,5  0,7  0,8
('97)  -4,4  1,5  1,3
Qilseeds  ('95)  -3,3  4,1  0,0  0,0
('97)  -3,3  3,3  0,0
Sugar  ('95)  -4,1  3,2  -1,0  -0,5
('97)  -7,2  2,8  -0,3
Milk  ('95)  -5,8  2,1  0,4  0,5
('97)  -5,7  1,6  0,7
Beef  ('95)  -4,3  2,1  -2,4  1,5
('97)  -4,6  1,0  -4,6
Pork  ('95)  -4,3  2,0  0,8  1,4
('97)  -4,3  1,8  0,3
Poultry  ('95)  -2,4  3,3  1,5  1,4
('97)  -2,4  3,2  1,0Table  6  CEEC-10  commodity market  balances,  1989 & 1994,
with European  Commission  projections 1994 - 2010.
2000/  2000*/
Balance  ('000t)  1989  1994  2002  2002*  2005  2010
Cereals  ('95)  -2777  1262  6113  521  7166  10978
('97)  -2777  -106  2436  -3183  -1078
difference  ('97-'95)  0  -1368  -8244
Oilseeds  ('95)  537  229  837  358  657  1121
('97)  537  288  1225  707  869
difference  ('97-'95)  0  59  212
Sugar  ('95)  -170  -652  -814  -443  -344
('97)  -534  -454  -212  4
difference  ('97-95)  -364  198  447
Milk  ('95)  4371  432  1679  2587  1818
('97]  3721  1256  1058  2006
difference  ('97-95)  -650  824  -581
Beef  ('95)  242  1  106  603  497
('97]  242  -82  71  435
difference  ('97-'95)  0  -83  -168
Pork  ('95)  403  -72  -39  -3  85
('97)  404  48  109  251
difference  ('97-95)  1  120  254
Poultry  ('95)  328  25  184  186  205
('97]  328  -10  170  194
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